Model
Partnership Table I . Models of customersupplier relations model 1. In this model, what is needed is a greater willingness on the part of the purchaser to invest in the internal operations of suppliers, and for suppliers to be willing to co-operate in the process. Two mechanisms for such improvement processes are formal supplier development programmes, and the active stimulation of inter-supplier learning (for example, through supplier associations -see Hines, 1994 on supplier co-ordination).
These are approaches which rely on the continuing commitment of customers to invest in the process, which may be difficult to sustain in periods of economic downturn, or when budgets are stretched. A further concern is that the model may only be applicable to a limited range of industries; little is known about how different industry characteristics affect supply-chain management practices (New, 1994; Payne, 1994) .
Model 3 offers a different perspective on supply-chain improvement. Here, the development of effective partnerships is driven by a process of almost Darwinian evolution. Firms which independently pursue best practice are thus "fitter" to be trading partners with other firms with similar aspirations. In this model, there is no assumption that best practice filters down an existing chain. Suppliers independently pursue excellence and develop best practices rather than needing the encouragement or expertise of their customers. This third model is useful in that it helps to explain instances where customers maintain long-term and mutually beneficial relationships with some suppliers without necessarily adopting the trappings of partnership or supplier development.
While the framework is not presumed to be a comprehensive of exhaustive taxonomy, the distillation of partnership ideas into these three models has significant implications for purchasing practice. All three models facilitate supply chain improvement, but each places different demands on purchasing organisations. For model 1, the key skills are developing trust, co-operative attitudes and consistency among those at the interface. For model 2, the emphasis shifts towards establishing mechanisms by which knowledge and skill can be transferred effectively. Model 3 leads to a sharper focus on the selection and evaluation of suppliers.
The theoretical justification of the framework is that previous attempts to explain supply-chain improvement gave too great a role to the isolated managerial choice of the customer in terms of procurement policy; examples were uncovered which did not fit easily into models 1 and 2, and one of these is used as the empirical support for the discussion in Burnes and New (1996b) . In this article, we present evidence which supports and helps to develop further this approach to supply-chain improvement. First, the article presents findings from the 1995 UMIST/A T Kearney/Institute of Logistics supply chain survey (Burnes and New, 1996a) . It then goes on to discuss the implications of these findings for customer-supplier relations. The article concludes by arguing that, whilst improving performance is not optional, there are a number of supplychain improvement approaches, each of which requires a different strategy, and each of which can have different implications for how costs and benefits are distributed.
Background
The 1995 UMIST/A T Kearney/Institute of Logistics survey set out to explore the idea of strategic collaboration and its relationship to operational effectiveness. It focused on those organisations who were believed to have an interesting story to tell. It did not attempt to gather data from a random sample of UK industry because there was little evidence that the ideas being explored had sufficiently diffused across industries for such an approach to be informative.
There were two main strands to the 1995 work: a questionnaire survey, and two complementary case studies in the automotive and food industries.
(1) • the implementation of co-managed inventory between a major retailer and a large food manufacture; • the development of the relationship between an automotive assembler and a key supplier, working under just-in-time supply. The survey was distributed among two groups: one group were volunteers who had participated in the 1994 UMIST/A T Kearney/Institute of Logistics survey; the other group were selected suppliers of the case study companies. This approach was designed so as only to include organisations who could be expected to be active or interested in customer-supplier improvement activities. It also ensured that the questionnaire was sent to named individuals who had access to the required information. For each participating firm, data was collected on relationships with both customers and suppliers, and also on specific supply-chain improvement initiatives. The research focused on experienced and well-informed companies in order to avoid the well-intentioned "guesses" of those with little experience in this area. In addition, a follow-up telephone survey was conducted among a number of questionnaire respondents in order to clarify and expand on the data they supplied. For the case studies, staff in different roles and at different levels from both buying and supplying firms were interviewed. Company documents and published material were also collected.
As the following will show, the survey mined a rich seam of data regarding collaborative activities between customers and suppliers which provides substantial evidence to support Burnes and New's (1996b) , supply chain improvement framework described in Table I .
The methodological underpinning of the work was the approach developed by New (1996) ; because of the difficulties of collecting absolute measure of the outcomes of buyer-supplier collaboration, this uses a subjective estimate of the distribution of costs and benefits for the analysis and categorisation of discrete initiatives.
Findings
A key part of the survey was to address four questions with regard to customersupplier improvement activities:
(1) Where do these activities take place? (2) Who takes the lead? (3) Who bears the cost? (4) How are the benefits distributed? Each participant in the research was asked to consider the four questions in relation to particular collaborative activities they had been involved in with their customers and suppliers. Their responses are presented in Figures 1 to 4 . The horizontal axis of each bar chart refers to the respondents' subjective estimate of the appropriate division between buyer and supplier: the extreme left hand bar indicates those projects designated "entirely the supplier" for the question; the extreme right hand bar, "entirely the customer"; the central bar, an equal split, and the other bars, the intermediate points.
As can be seen from Figure 1 , the locations of the collaborative activities were reasonably evenly distributed between those which were wholly based at suppliers' premises, those that were wholly based at customers' premises and those which were spread across both. However, Figure 2 shows that regardless of where they were based, such activities tended to be initiated more by customers than suppliers. Interestingly, these results combine the views of the participating firms responding as both buyers and suppliers; the pattern each histogram is approximately the same for responses from each perspective taken separately. This means the patterns displayed in the graphs reflect the views of both buyers and suppliers. The asymmetry between customers and suppliers becomes more pronounced when the distribution of costs and benefits is examined (Figures 3  and 4 ). As Figure 3 shows, the costs of improvement activities are apparently biased towards suppliers rather than the customer but, as Figure 4 shows, the benefits from these activities are biased towards customers. Given that the concept of "win-win" is often cited as being one of the mainstays of partnerships, this is clearly an important finding.
Nevertheless, despite the overall asymmetry in the distribution of "pain and gain", it is important to note that, as Figure 5 shows, the distribution of costs and benefits does vary considerably depending on the nature of the improvement activity being undertaken. Figure 5 lists the categories of improvement activities identified by respondents. These range from the implementation of EDI to changes in order mechanisms and information flows. Analysis of this data is obviously limited by two factors: one is the validity of the classifications used (which was based on interpretation of respondents own free-form descriptions of projects, sometimes with telephone follow-up to resolve ambiguities), and, second, the small numbers of cases in some of the categories. Nevertheless, we suspect the results point to a simple difference between those requiring changes in both customers and suppliers (basically the first four or five) and those which mainly require suppliers to make internal changes to meet customers' needs or operating procedures. What Figure 5 also shows is that the more an activity involves changes in both the customer's and supplier's operations (e.g. the introduction of EDI), the more there is likely to be an even distribution of costs and benefits. Similarly, the more an activity is focused on the supplier, the more likely it is that the supplier will pay the costs and the customer will reap the benefits. Therefore, what we may surmise from Figure 5 is that improvement activities can fall into at least two categories. The first category contains "interface" activities which require customers and suppliers to work together to make complementary changes in both their organisations and where there is a rough equality of costs and benefits. The second category includes those activities which are predominantly based in the supplier's premises, requiring them to make improvements to their capabilities in order to offer a better service to the customer in question, but which may also improve the supplier's ability to service other customers as well. These can be classed as supplier development activities.
In essence, what appears to be happening in the latter case is that customers are strongly indicating where the supplier needs to make improvements in order to maintain or increase its competitiveness vis-à-vis alternative suppliers. This point will be examined further in the discussion section. However, for now, what we can say is that this is wholly consistent with Burnes and New's (1996b) , supply-chain improvement model.
Discussion
In part, the findings presented above would seem to be consistent with the popular view of customer-supplier partnerships; certainly, Figures 1 and 2 , dealing with the location of improvement activities and the identification of which party initiated them, sustain this view. However, Figures 3 and 4 , dealing with costs and benefits, appear to tell a different story. One of the alleged main planks of customer-supplier partnerships is the concept of "win-win". Yet the evidence from this research would seem to indicate that it is customers who tend to win and suppliers who tend to pay.
Taking Figure 5 , which looks at costs and benefits in terms of the type of collaborative activities customers and suppliers engage in, a slightly different picture can be seen. The top quarter of the figure shows that there are a number of activities in which the costs and benefits are evenly distributed. The remaining types of activity shown in Figure 5 are ones where the changes tend to be made mainly by, and within, the supplier. In terms of costs, therefore, it could be argued that it is not unreasonable for those who need to make the changes to bear the cost of them. In cases where both customers and suppliers have to change, then each pays for its own changes, but where the changes are primarily made by the supplier, then it should bear the brunt of the costs. This does not, though, explain why it is the customer who appears to gain the benefit in such cases. Certainly, situations where suppliers spend money to improve their activities and customers reap the main rewards would seem a prime example of "win-lose" and not "win-win".
Nevertheless, though the notion of "win-win" needs to be treated with caution, the findings do not totally undermine it. There will be situations where it is perfectly reasonable for one party to contribute more to the costs and take less from the benefits. There are at least two types of situation where this makes sense for both parties. The first is where a supplier requires some improvement to meet increasing expectations in an industrial sector. This often involves working with a particular customer, but the outcome is more about the overall competitive positioning of the supplier in respect to industry norms. One example of this is Ford's insistence on suppliers adopting certain quality systems and techniques. In the early 1980s, suppliers may have seen this as an unnecessary investment but, seen from today's perspective, it proved fundamental in allowing those suppliers to remain in business in a period when customers expect zero defects (Dale 1994; Oakland 1993) . Even in the absence of explicit supplier development, vendors may reap advantages from across their customer base from improvements made necessary by demanding clients.
The second type of situation is where a supplier treats such a collaborative activity as an investment in the relationship with the customer which will not reap immediate benefits, but may be considered worthwhile in the longer term. In some cases, a supplier may be able to benefit by making an "investment" (say, a cost reduction) in its relationship with a customer, and then achieve a "return" as the investment enables the customer to increase sales, thus generating more demand for the supplier's goods. In the authors' experience, this model is often used by customers as a rhetorical device in an attempt to stimulate collaboration, but is commonly treated with some caution by suppliers. This is because, for the logic to work, suppliers need considerable faith in the customer's sustained willingness and ability to:
• translate the benefit passed on by the supplier into increased sales (rather than, say, immediate profits); and • pass on increased demand to that particular supplier (compare the caricature of new product introduction in Womack et al., 1990) . However, there are other types of delayed "return" where benefits to a supplier are more to do with organisational learning and the general building of the relationship. Examples of this could include Somerfield Stores' recent experiment with Co-Managed Inventory, as well as EDI and CAD/CAM in their early days (Burnes and New, 1996a) . Furthermore, this second type of situation can itself be split into those initiatives with tangible if long-term benefits for the supplier, and other "promotional" activities with more symbolic outcomes, designed to help a relationship along and send the right signals, rather than achieve concrete benefits.
Therefore, the research presented in this article does not invalidate the concept of "win-win" per se, but it does indicate that a more sophisticated and long-term view of the costs and benefits of customer supplier collaboration is required. Simplistic and short-term approaches to "win-win" can and do lead to unrealistic expectations and eventual disillusionment (A T Kearney, 1994; Lamming, 1994) . Instead, it is necessary to take a less rose-tinted view of what can be achieved from customer-supplier partnerships. This takes us back to the framework for supply-chain improvement described in Table I .
The findings from the research would seem to support the applicability of models 1 and 2. Figure 5 shows that there are a number of types of improvement activity which clearly fall into the model 1 -interface -category. It also shows that there a number which clearly fall into the model 2 -supplier developmentcategory. Figure 5 does not show any evidence for the model 3 -best in class -category. However, this is not surprising given that what was being investigated were examples of joint improvement activity and model 3 applies to situations where suppliers undertake independent improvement activity.
Conclusions
In offering support for Burnes and New's (1996b) , supply-chain improvement framework, the findings from the research presented in this article have significant implications for customer-supplier relations. In evaluating whether or not to do business with a particular supplier, many companies now tend to have very rigorous criteria for assessing their capabilities. However, once a supplier has been selected, most companies prefer to group suppliers by product/service rather than capability (Lehmann and O'Shaughnessy, 1982; Vokurka et al., 1996) . Though such classifications may well suffice for most day-to-day purchasing activities, they tend to be less useful when choosing suppliers for improvement activities, so that customers are often thrown back on more informal and ad hoc selection criteria. For example, a supplier may be perceived to be (or will be in the future) under-performing in some area (e.g., quality), or the customer may be looking for "volunteers" to take part in a particular initiative which it is keen to evaluate (e.g. EDI).
The danger of this is that all improvement activities can become classed as being the same, whether they cover interface activities or internal process changes, whether they involve joint cost and benefit sharing or a more asymmetrical distribution of costs and benefits. This article has argued that there are distinct types of improvement activities and distinct types of suppliers. To treat all activities and all suppliers in the same way may be wasting the resources of both parties. It may also lead to severe misunderstandings in terms of who pays and who gains from such activities.
In consequence, as well as categorising suppliers for day-to-day purposes, there is also a need to develop a different categorisation for them in terms of improvement activities. Using Burnes and New's (1996b) framework, some would be model 3 suppliers (already operating or moving towards best practice). Attempting to "improve" model 3 suppliers might be counterproductive and could certainly be a waste of scarce resources for both parties. Other suppliers would be classed either as model 1 (where interface activities were appropriate) or model 2 (where internal process improvements were required). Though some suppliers could be classed as either model 1 or model 2 (i.e., needing both interface and process improvements), it might be difficult effectively to pursue internal process improvements until interface issues such as communication and co-operation between a customer and a supplier were firmly established. It should also be noted that because model 1 and model 2 improvement activities have different foci, they require different skills to carry them out and result in different outcomes. Model 1 activities should be genuinely co-operative -both parties need to change their ways of working, both contribute to the cost of this and both share in the benefits. However, model 2 activities are less co-operative and more directive on the customer's part. They require the customer to act almost as a consultant -identifying problems, suggesting solutions and assisting in the change process. It is a situation where the supplier pays the direct costs and the customer usually takes the immediate benefits, although one should not ignore the on-going costs to the customer of facilitating such activities nor the longer-term benefits to the supplier of improving quality, introducing just-in-time, etc. Therefore, to try to run model 1 activities in parallel with model 2 may lead to confusion, and may be one reason why so many suppliers now seem disillusioned with the partnership concept (A T Kearney, 1994; see also Lamming, 1994) .
A further reason why it makes sense for customers to categorise suppliers in this manner is that the skills and resources needed to implement model 1 activities will be very different from those needed to implement model 2 activities. (Dealing with model 3 suppliers may also require a different set of skills and resources). Establishing a single group to deal with both model 1 and 2 suppliers may overstretch the group's skills, underestimate the resources and create a lack of consistency or focus. Therefore, whilst it is vital for many customers and suppliers to work together to improve performance and capabilities, there is also a need to be discriminating about the type of activities undertaken and the assumptions made about the distribution of costs and benefits.
In conclusion, this article has shown that customers and suppliers can and do work together in a variety of ways in order to improve their performance. Some of these can bring immediate benefits (as well as having immediate costs) which are shared. In other cases, the immediate benefits (and costs) can be unevenly distributed, though over the longer term both parties may reap considerable benefits. Customers need to be aware of the different approaches to improvement activities and organise accordingly. Suppliers need to recognise that "win-win" needs to be seen in a broad and long-term perspective. Both must accept that whilst improving performance is not optional, there is more than one way to skin a cat.
